Charting Banking XXII: three years after Lehman
Three years after Lehman concerns about the banks’ state of affairs have resurfaced once again. The strange thing is that the performance has been very predictable: a steady improvement in all fronts. Once again we are going to take advantage of the pret-a-porter graphs from bankregdata.com (I am very lazy). But this time it includes a couple of new charts to address the capital ratios improvement.
It does not look like the crisis is deepening, doesn’t it? 30-89 delinquencies in particular are at levels not seen since Lehman collapsed. When people talk about the credit issues of the banking system it really surprises me. The fundamentals are definitely improving.
One of the most common accusations is that banks are “extending and pretending”. Well, loan extensions are a normal part of a bank operation. Good clients with good credit normally get extensions. Despite all the talk of recent years, there is a good difference between liquidity issues and solvency issues.
But I understand people’s concern with restructured loans, if credit standards and interests payments are reduced for lenders it might indicate credit deterioration. It is still part of good banking, especially when rates are zero so there is room for helping lenders while maintaining spreads, but it is an issue that should be addressed.
The problem is that the bankregdata ratio that I have been publishing includes restructured loans. It was the conservative way. Though, considering the improved conditions I think it is time to show the progress without restructured loans. And it has been dramatic.
I do not even know where the “extend and pretend” argument comes from. I understand that Japanese banks were very slow in recognizing their commercial lending problems in the 90s, because of cozy keiretzu connections, and all the resulting problems.
However, Japanese banks had non-performing assets reaching 8%. US banks are nowhere near those levels and most have been building reserves, modifying and extending good loans, charging-off the bad ones, foreclosing the zombie ones and disposing REO.
And not including reestructured loans:
It has not been a pretty process but all the headlines about robo-signing and wrong foreclosures are not the result of banks being slow. Even more, for most of them there is not even the incentive to delay when their capital ratios give them space for maneuver to accelerate issues and leave the crisis behind.
And I have not yet counted the very large reserves built over the last 3 years, maybe I should.
Most banks are most probably over-reserved. It also hints that most current provisions, that are depressing banks’ earnings, are fake expenses.
Not that there is anything wrong with that, better be safe than sorry. An overcapitalized and over-reserved banking system is better for all of us. It reduces systemic risk and provides a buffer in case of external shocks … like Europe.
And from an investor point of view, these reserves can provide a nice margin of safety. Most of the credit problems have been recognized and more than 50% of them are already in the past. So if an investor underestimated some hidden issues … there are lots of reserves – and cash from operations – to take care of them.
We have to be careful though, each bank is its own animal. Maybe on the aggregate the system is being managed conservatively; but each bank as an investment has to be addressed individually.